Nick Nostitz's report on red shirt protests

Photojournalist Nick Nostitz has written a detailed eyewitness account of the red shirt protests with photos at New Mandala. His account begins on 26 March and ends on 14 April with the red shirts surrendering. It helps paint a picture of the situation on the ground as events unfolded and the feelings and attitudes of the red shirts.

Update: The Bangkok Post has a timeline of the red shirt protests. It provides a brief summary of the key events that happened over the same period as Nick's report.

Thitinan: our country is governed by an establishment

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, in an op-ed in the New York Times (link via BP), contains this quote which eloquently sums up the failure of democracy in Thailand.

Westerners think of Thailand as a democracy, ruled by the will of the majority. In reality, our country is governed by an establishment made up of the monarchy, military and bureaucracy. Elections are held, but if the establishment doesn’t like the winning party, the government is dissolved. Unable to rely on the ballot box, people take to the streets.

Shawn Crispin wrote something similar in the Asia Times.

Thailand's conflict is more accurately portrayed as a struggle between competing elites, both able to mobilize disruptive masses to their political calls, jockeying for position ahead of an uncertain royal succession.

Thitinan's editorial concludes,

The onus rests on Mr. Abhisit and his backers. The elite must stand aside and let the power of the ballot carry the day. We need to discard the undemocratic provisions of the 2007 Constitution and replace them with elements of its popularly drafted 1997 precursor. We need a fully elected legislature, courts that can make impartial decisions on election outcomes and independent watchdog agencies.

By Tuesday afternoon people were out everywhere, celebrating what was left of the New Year. But don’t be fooled by this uneasy calm. Until Thailand becomes a true democracy, we can expect more chaos in the streets.

I sincerely hope both peace and democracy prevail.

The Economist from 1932 to 2009

The Economist has taken a fearless approach to reporting on a subject that was once unmentionable -- the role of the Thai royal family in politics. Its December 2008 edition carried two articles which frankly discussed the monarchy's role in Thai politics. The issue was not distributed in Thailand, and subsequent issues of The Economist which have contained articles with references to the monarchy have not been distributed in Thailand. The articles have all been available on The Economist's website and no doubt translated and circulated to some degree in Thailand.

A few days ago The Economist published a report from its archives on the 1932 Siamese Revolution on its website. The full text follows.

Last Friday a successful revolution was achieved in Siam by the officers—or a clique among the officers—of the naval and military forces. The heir to the throne and the chief of police were placed under arrest; and the King, who was not in Bangkok when the coup was carried out, returned to the capital and accepted the fait accompli. The only casualty seems to have one high military officer, who was shot and wounded in the act of resisting arrest; and this sole victim is happily expected to recover. The revolutionaries deprecate the application of the term “revolution” to their work; but a revolution does not cease to be a revolution when it is accomplished without loss of life; and this Siamese specimen is not difficult to classify and pigeon-hole. Like the recent alarums and excursions in Chile, the present upheaval in Siam is evidently a political expression of the malaise produced by the pressure of the economic crisis. But the crisis has caught Siam in a different stage of social development from some of these other countries; and accordingly, this Siamese revolution had taken rather a different form. While our Latin-American revolutionaries move in an endless cycle from one dictator or one junta to another, and while the Japanese Fascists are moving backwards from a pseudo-constitutional regime towards a one-party tyranny, the Siamese revolutionaries are moving in the opposite direction—from absolute monarchy towards self-government. This Siamese affair is a movement, engineered by military officers, for securing a parliamentary constitution; and the nearest obvious modern analogy is the Turkish revolution of 1908. In Siam, as in Turkey, the military officers are the political radicals because they are the element in the country which has been the most deeply imbued with Western ideas. The economic crisis brought the political movement in Siam to a dénouement by imposing the necessity for an increase in taxation—an increase which the late Government attempted to provide for by imposing a tax on salaries. The Siamese peasantry, whose minds are hardly touched yet by Westernisation, and whose taxes have actually been lightened, seem to have been passive spectators. It remains to be see how these peasant masses will get on with the small and rather exotic Westernised intelligentsia if the intelligentsia now comes into effective power through the curious semi-democratic constitution to which the King has now agreed.

The 18 April 2009 print edition of The Economist has also been withheld from circulation in Thailand. It contains an article titled The trouble with the king. Here are the paragraphs which no doubt ensured the magazine can't be sold in Thailand.

If the correspondent had in mind something like the Dutch monarchy off shopping on their bicycles, in Thailand that vision got hijacked on the way to the supermarket. Today King Bhumibol Adulyadej, at 81 the world’s longest-reigning monarch, has actually accrued power over the years, and remains central to Thailand’s political chaos. This helps explain one bizarre episode among many in the country’s latest crisis. At a time when large-scale bloodshed seemed possible as the army confronted anti-government “red shirt” protesters in Bangkok, Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister deposed in a coup in 2006, gave a television interview. His voice quaking with emotion, and doubtless recalling the king’s famous televised carpeting of an army chief and a protest leader after a massacre in Bangkok in 1992, he beseeched “his majesty” to intervene again to end the showdown.

Yet Mr Thaksin, in exile and convicted in absentia of corruption, is accused by his opponents of being a closet republican. And he has indeed come close to criticising the palace, by demanding the resignation of two of the king’s privy councillors, widely assumed to be behind the 2006 coup. When “yellow shirt” protesters laid siege to the government led by Mr Thaksin’s loyalists late last year, they did so invoking the king’s name. Yet now even Mr Thaksin felt obliged to profess again his loyalty to the king, and to pay homage to his power.

Such regal influence was far from preordained when the king came to the throne as a stripling, the American-born son of a half-Chinese commoner. He and his image were moulded by palace advisers and by successive military governments. They saw how useful it would be to have a figurehead depicted as not merely beyond reproach but very nearly divine, for the king’s blessing could then legitimise what otherwise would look awfully like any old Latin American junta, in Thailand’s case backed by business cronies and the Bangkok elite. The need helps explain why a king held supposedly in wonder by his subjects warrants one of the world’s most draconian laws against lèse-majesté. The king has been not just a figurehead for Thailand’s elites, but a source of patronage and power in his own right, with destabilising consequences, especially now his reign is in its fumbling twilight. He has long bestowed honours in exchange for donations to his good causes. The causes may benefit his beloved rural poor, but the patronage system perpetuates royal influence.

*Many thanks to Bangkok Pundit and Political Prisoners in Thailand for their excellent blogging which has been the source of many useful links and information for me.

Black Songkran 2009

They are calling it Black Songkran. Instead of the usual fun and water throwing there were bullets and petrol bombs on the streets of Bangkok. For the moment at least calm has returned, but the fundamental conflict has not been resolved. It is probably only a matter of time before there are more red shirt protests with the potential for more violence. There is a lot of news to digest, so here I will collect links to some articles with brief quotes.

BBC journalist Jonathan Head sums the whole situation up well writing that there are no winners. There are also no leaders that can mediate between the two sides and create a peaceful resolution.

There appear to be no towering, Obama-like figures in Thailand, who can win the respect of both camps. Certainly not Mr Abhisit, who often looks uncomfortably out of place in the rural, red heartlands of the north and north-east.

How he deals with the leaders of the "red uprising" now - and how that compares with the treatment given to last year's "yellow uprising" - will be an important test of his promise to uphold the rule of law impartially.

So the conflict which erupted so spectacularly in Bangkok and Pattaya over the past week will probably rumble on, steadily eroding the confidence of investors, tourists and the Thai people, in a stable future for their country.

Much of the problem is rooted in the lack of justice and rule of law. David Streckfuss writes that all parties involved must stand and face the justice system.

The PAD said it needed to seize the airport. UDD leaders said the coup was illegal and the PAD has not been punished. They said therefore that they had to apply pressure by closing down the roads and wreaking havoc on the activities of the government.

But what about dropping all the discussion of "necessity" and "justification" for breaking the law, and an honest declaration: "I knowingly broke the law and will serve the time." Period.

The simple and evident truth becomes obscured through partisan rationalisations which appears (and is) self-serving hypocrisy.

Every Thai political leader claims to be acting for the good of the nation, and says much about sacrifice. A sacrifice would entail adopting a noble attitude, and a willingness to suffer the consequences for doing something you believed in.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak also addresses issues of justice. She writes that the red shirts are expressing anger at injustice in Thai society.

The undercurrents against establishment forces should not be underestimated. The lack of recognition and accommodation will make these undercurrents pent-up and dangerous.

The onus for the way ahead now rests on Mr Abhisit and his supporters. The reds' miscalculated gamble has made their months-long movement futile. What is needed next is the willingness of the establishment forces to accept, address and accommodate the reds' sense of injustice and inequality.

Otherwise the demands for greater social justice and share of the pie may well reappear in other shapes, forms and colours down the road.

Giles Ungpakorn was part of the red shirt movement and fled Thailand to escape lese majeste charges. He describes the conflict as a class war for a genuine democracy and a challenge to the monarchy.

What we have been seeing in Thailand since late 2005 is a growing class war between the poor and the old elites. It is, of course, not a pure class war. Due to a vacuum on the left in the past, millionaire and populist politicians like Thaksin Shinawatra have managed to provide leadership to the poor.

The urban and rural poor, who form the majority of the electorate, are the Red Shirts. They want the right to choose a democratically elected government. They started out as passive supporters of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai government, but have since formed a new citizens' movement they call Real Democracy.

[...]

Yet the Red Shirts are not merely Thaksin puppets. They are self-organised in community groups, and some are showing frustration with Thaksin's lack of progressive leadership, especially over his insistence that they be "loyal" to the crown.

Andrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly, academics at ANU and authors of New Mandala, also discuss the role of the monarchy. It was not so long ago that this topic was barely mentioned, but from Paul Handley's 2006 book The King Never Smiles to the more recent articles that saw issues of The Economist withdrawn from sale in Thailand, the monarchy and its role in Thai politics is now coming under regular scrutiny in the international media. Walker and Farrelly write,

When the smoke clears, there will, of course, be vigorous attempts to put the royal genie back into its gilded and apolitical bottle. Legal restrictions on royal commentary will be enforced with increasing gusto. Thais who dare speak up about the country’s political realities will face the risk of heavy legal sanctions. International commentators calling for free speech will be vilified as cultural imperialists seeking to impose western values on the loyal subjects of the Thai king. But these attempts to impose silence won’t work because each clamp-down on royal discussion generates yet another, more penetrating, round of debate, speculation and, in some cases, irreverence.

With or without Thaksin’s latest provocations, and whatever the ultimate fate of the red-shirts, the extraordinary events of the past few years mean that silence on Thailand’s monarchy is no longer a viable option.

The Economist, which has consistently good analysis of Thai politics, ponders on the future direction Thailand might take.

Many Thais are heartily sick of the crisis and its enormous damage to the economy in terms of lost investment and tourists. Another military coup is rumoured, although it is unclear where the army’s political inclinations lie. Presumably Mr Abhisit’s days are numbered as prime minister, though who might succeed him is anyone’s guess. Mr Thaksin hopes to ride the protests and return to power. Yet with plenty of scores to settle, his would presumably be a brittle and autocratic rule at a time when reconciliation is badly needed. Fresh elections are probably the best bet, with the promise of a search for a broad political consensus for constitutional change to allow a more representative politics. For now, with violence in the streets again, Thailand teeters on the brink.

It seems Abhisit has clung onto power for now, although it is only a matter of time before he faces another challenge. Ensuring that all those responsible for violence in the past few months -- the red shirts, yellow shirts and the army -- face the justice system would help strengthen his position and give him credibility. If the red shirts are really committed to achieving democracy they need to spend some time spelling out their agenda. I suggest possibly returning to the 1997 constitution, with some amendments, followed by fresh parliamentary elections. Whatever happens all sides must work for a peaceful resolution. Thailand cannot afford to be torn apart by violence. It is the ordinary, working class people that would have to pay the highest price.

Democracy in crisis

Thailand's democratic crisis

By Tyrell Haberkorn

The turbulent polarisation between "red" and "yellow" political camps in Thailand is a symptom of a deeper disorder, says Tyrell Haberkorn.

[Originally published at openDemocracy on 14 April 2009. Republished under a Creative Commons licence.]

Thai citizens are again living under a state of emergency and the threat of bloodshed. The successive mass mobilisations by supporters of the "yellow" and "red" camps could in other circumstances be seen as evidence of a vibrant engagement with democratic politics; in the context of the near-meltdown of Thailand's constitutional order, they are more symptoms of a dangerous crisis. Where does Thailand go from here?

The most recent events are part of a series that began in 2005-06 when members of the fledgling Peoples' Alliance for Democracy (PAD) first donned yellow shirts and called for the removal of the elected prime minister and head of the Thai Rak Thai party, Thaksin Shinawatra. The demonstrators had their wish when (in September 2006) the military ousted the populist Thaksin, who had already left the country amid outstanding conflict-of-interest charges (on which he was to be convicted in October 2008) but who has retained much of his popularity among Thailand's rural and poor people.

An inconclusive period of military rule was followed by elections in December 2007 that brought to power the People Power Party (PPP), a rebranded version of Thai Rak Thai. The "yellow" camp persisted in campaigning against this outcome; its activities reached a new peak when PAD demonstrators laid siege to Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi international airport (and the smaller Don Muang domestic airport) in November-December 2008. A court decision that ended the siege led to the resignation of the government and the appointment on 17 December of a new prime minister from the Democrat Party, the England-educated Abhisit Vejjajiva.

This did nothing to still the tumult; Thai politics have moved from the chaos of December to the deep crisis of April.

The meaning of chaos

The rhetoric has sharpened alongside the polarisation. From his exile, Thaksin Shinawatra addressed the red shirts on the evening of 12 April 2009 and commented: "Now that the military has brought tanks out on the streets, it's time for the people to come out for a revolution." It is reported too that Thaksin "has promised to return and lead it" (see "Thailand's ugly crisis", Economist, 13 April 2009).

The dangers of escalation are evident - even if a show of strength by the Thai military on the streets of Bangkok on 13 April defused the immediate protests. The most spectacular of these was in the resort town of Pattaya on 11 April, when the red-shirt activists calling for Abhisit's resignation invaded the site of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean's) annual summit. In forcing the summit's cancellation and the attending regional leaders' evacuation, the demonstrators followed the example of the airport siege in exposing Thailand's breakdown to an international audience.

Abhisit responded to the summit humiliation by declaring a state of emergency on 12 April covering Bangkok and the surrounding areas. This placed prohibitions on public gatherings and gave greater powers of arrest to the government. The red-shirt protestors were defiant: they continued to storm government buildings, surround the seat of government, and remain in the streets. At least some sought to go further, by confronting opponents and seeking to destroy buildings and vehicles. The army and other state forces responded with tear-gas, tanks and live bullets. Amid reports of government cover-ups and restriction of information, the precise number of the dead and injured on all sides is unknown.

How to characterise this chaos? The most convenient and perhaps plausible way is to see what is happening in Thailand as a straightforward contest for power between Abhisit Vejjajiva's government and Thaksin Shinawatra, symbolised in the colourful struggle between yellow and red shirts. The problem with this view is indicated by the fact that both groups claim to be supporting and embodying "democracy". The passionate appeals to principle and ideals cannot be ignored or dismissed. Thailand's crisis is about more than power alone.

Indeed, much more is at stake, even if it is hard to define exactly what. The historian Michael Montesano has identified the current situation as revolutionary, arguing that "neither an election nor a mediated process of reconciliation" will resolve it. But he leaves the content of this revolution unnamed, instead commenting that "the real significance of [the] debacle at Pattaya may lie in its prompting Asian leaders, along with the rest of us, to anticipate the process of revolutionary change on which Thailand now seems to have embarked" (see Michael Montesano, "On the brink, again", Straits Times, 13 April 2009).

The implication that Thailand's now lengthy series of protests represents a larger social movement is echoed by the political scientist Giles Ji Ungpakorn - now also (since February 2009) living abroad after accumulating threats to his freedom - who identifies growing republican tendencies within the red-shirt phenomenon that express a demand for participation in democracy by all Thai citizens (see "The Reds' Fight for Real Democracy", Guardian, 13 April 2009). The argument is that while some red shirts are mainline supporters of Thaksin, others are criticising the disproportionate role of elites in governance. The bus-drivers, workers, and young people protesting in Bangkok and in provincial centres have taken to the streets to stake their claim for a role in a future Thai society.

In this perspective, Thailand's disorder might be seen in terms of a longer view, where many of its people - under great economic pressures, and amid rooted structures of power - are seeking a transformation in the underlying social and political relations of rule. The warning contained in Antonio Gramsci's Prison Notebooks seems apt in this respect: "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears."

The colour of change

The morbid symptoms include a tide of repression - in particular, the curtailment of free speech - under Abhisit Vejjajiva's leadership. The conviction of the Australian novelist Harry Nicolaides has received the most international attention (which contributed to his release); but many more such cases of lese-majesté being prosecuted or investigated in 2009 of which Thais themselves are the main targets.

It was anticipation of a heavy sentence for alleged lesè majesté in his book on the military takeover of 2006 - A Coup for the Rich - that led Giles Ji Ungpakorn to flee to England. Chiranuch Premchaiporn, the editor of the online newspaper Prachatai, was arrested in early March and her offices searched under the "computer-crimes" law of 2007; her alleged offence was vague and unspecified: not removing comments that contained content threatening to national security. Chiranuch is at the time of writing out on bail.

Suwicha Thakhor, an engineer, was sentenced to ten years in prison on 3 April 2009 on charges under both Article 112 of Thailand's criminal code (the lese-majesté law) and the computer-crimes law. Suwicha's alleged crime was posting an image insulting to the monarchy. Even after his conviction, the image or even a description of it has not been released. The expanded use of these two legal measures to silence any questioning, let alone criticism, of the royal institution in Thailand indicates a profound insecurity about its stability as well as the power of its political allies.

The repression of speech, the reconsolidation of the royal institution, violence in the streets, and a descent into bitter factional enmity - these morbid symptoms of Thailand's dysfunctional and unstable polity clearly have the potential to become mortal wounds.

Do they offer other potentials? Philip Bowring sees a possible "silver lining" in the current crisis: "It might still convince enough of the yellow shirts that demands for a full democracy will not go away, and enough of the red shirts that democracy unchecked by law easily leads to tyranny - and both of them that Thailand needs a monarch who is symbol of the entire nation" (see "What Shirt for Thailand?", New York Times, 13 April 2009). This assessment, however, leaves unquestioned the relationship between the enduring royal institution and the possibility of full democracy or the just use of law in Thailand. A lesson of this now lengthy crisis is that scrutiny of the sources and uses of power in the interests of strengthening democracy in Thailand and the participation of all citizens in governance is now needed.

The red shirts or yellow shirts alone will not provide an answer to Thailand's deep-rooted problems; neither will its existing elites and power-structures. The future of the country - whether that will involve a reconsolidation of the royal institution, a republic, or a not-yet-articulated third option (as Pavin Chachavalpongpun suggests) - is in the balance. What is clear amid much uncertainty is that any longer-term solution must find a way to accommodate the interests and voices of the mostly poor and working-class Thai citizens who have filled the streets in Bangkok and the provinces. The hour is late, but in the commitment of Thais to "democracy" lies a slender reed of hope.

Taiwan-Thailand connections

Now I am living in Taiwan life in Thailand seems somewhat distant. Yesterday I joined the Thai New Year (Songkran) celebrations in Taoyuan, which was just like going back to Thailand. There are about 75,000 Thai workers living in Taiwan and 20,000 of them live in Taoyuan, a city near Taipei.



The event held at the Taoyuan Stadium featured Buddhist monks, traditional Thai dance and Blue Sky, a Thai rock band with my friend MJ Klein on guitar.Of course there was some water thrown, but it was very tame in comparison to what happens in Thailand.

I have written a more detailed report on my Taiwan blog and also uploaded some photos at flickr.



On Friday night a saw a new Taiwanese movie called Detours to Paradise. The film portrays the difficult lives of migrant workers from Southeast Asia in Taiwan. The plot revolves around an Indonesian maid and her Thai boyfriend played by Banlop Lomnoi.

I reviewed the film on my Taiwan blog. The excellent Thai cinema blog, Wise Kwai's Film Journal, also mentioned the film.

Thai media on Listening Post

Al Jazeera's Listening Post program of 27 February 2009 featured a story on the Thai media. The program looks at Thai PBS, Prime Minister Abhisit and the lese majeste law. The Global Village Voices section of the program includes a comment by David (author of this blog) from 7:23 to 7:48.

Al Jazeera also recently reported on the situation in the deep south. Reporter Step Vaessen reported directly from the south and also interviewed PM Abhisit about the situation there. The links are to the videos at YouTube.

Harry freed with royal pardon

Australian Harry Nicolaides, who was serving a prison sentence for lese majeste, has been granted a royal pardon and deported from Thailand. The Age reports:

Australian author Harry Nicolaides, who was jailed in Thailand for criticising the country's royal family in a book, is on his way home after being granted a royal pardon.

Nicolaides walked free from prison yesterday after Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej issued a royal decree on Wednesday, his brother Forde Nicolaides said.

The 41-year-old author spent five months in a Thai jail after being arrested last August for insulting the Thai monarchy in his book Verisimilitude. He was sentenced to three years' jail last month after pleading guilty to 'lese majeste' - the crime of criticising the royals.

His release ends a "six-month nightmare" for the family, his brother said.

Human rights problems abound

It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it. - Aung San Suu Kyi

Andrew Walker of New Mandala has an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on human rights in Thailand. The article focuses on the lese majeste case of Harry Nicolaides and the Thai military's treatment of Rohingya refugees. These are just two of the issues that have been in the news in the past few weeks but there are also more lese majeste cases and Amnesty International's recent report on torture in the Deep South.

Giles Ungpakorn's case is important and will bring even more international attention to the issue of lese majeste. He has shown a brave and principled response to the charges so far. He is very articulate in both English and Thai so he can communicate his arguments to both domestic and international audiences. He is sure to have much support from academics around the world.

Giles writes why we must oppose lese majeste:

The lese majeste law in Thailand represents a gross attack on the freedom of speech, freedom of expression and academic freedom. The practical impact is that we do not have a fully developed democracy or internationally accepted academic standards in our universities.

I think lese majeste must be treated as a human rights and freedom of speech issue. There is no need for diplomatic niceties. You can still speak out about this issue while maintaining respect for the king. I am no longer living in Thailand so that gives me the freedom to write on this blog without fear. And although I don't know exactly what Thai people think about this issue I am sure many of them are talking about it and although they may not express their views publicly, they would be discussing them in private.

I think the most important thing to recognise is that these problems are not a product of the Thaksin regime or the military coup. They are deeply ingrained within Thai institutions and exacerbated by a weak rule of law and a culture that suppresses honest criticism. The military in particular should be singled out for scrutiny. It acts with a culture of impunity. It has never faced justice for the 2006 coup or the Tak Bai massacre. In the recent incident involving Rohingya refugees it merely obfuscated rather than taking concrete action to address the problem.

There is no simple solution to these problems. Effecting institutional and cultural change will take decades. However, in the short term there are two important things that can be done. The first is having more international observers present in Thailand. Their presence will help in clearly documenting the problems and also perhaps moderating the behaviour of those that might abuse human rights.

The second is for foreign governments to be far more frank in their dealings with the Thais. If they are prepared to call a spade a spade in neighbouring Burma, then why not do the same in Thailand? Thai society has a degree of democracy and openness that Burma does not so such statements can have much greater influence. The time to speak out is now for failure to speak out against injustice is to condone it. There is no excuse for silence.